Name
gcc
Version
11.5.0
Type
library
Description
GNU cc and gcc C compilers
Licenses
GPL-3.0-with-GCC-exception & GPL-3.0-only
PURL
-
CPE
cpe:2.3:*:gnu:gcc:11.5.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Other Versions#
Patches#
#
Title
Author
Resolve
1
libcpp: escape non-ASCII source bytes in -Wbidi-chars=
David Malcolm <dmalcolm@redhat.com>
CVE-2021-42574
2
gcc: armv4: pass fix-v4bx to linker to support EABI.
Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>
3
libcc1: fix libcc1's install path and rpath
Robert Yang <liezhi.yang@windriver.com>
4
gentypes/genmodes: Do not use __LINE__ for maintaining
Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
5
gcc: Fix argument list too long error.
Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>
6
Use the defaults.h in ${B} instead of ${S}, and t-oe in ${B}
Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>
7
libgcc_s: Use alias for __cpu_indicator_init instead of
Szabolcs Nagy <nsz@port70.net>
8
Don't search host directory during "relink" if $inst_prefix
Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>
9
gcc: poison-system-directories
Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>
10
libcpp: capture and underline ranges in -Wbidi-chars=
David Malcolm <dmalcolm@redhat.com>
CVE-2021-42574
11
debug/101473 - apply debug prefix maps before checksumming
Richard Biener <rguenther@suse.de>
12
mingw32: Enable operation_not_supported
Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>
13
Link libgcc using LDFLAGS, not just SHLIB_LDFLAGS
Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>
14
Ensure target gcc headers can be included
Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>
15
libiberty: Fix infinite recursion in rust demangler.
Nick Clifton <nickc@redhat.com>
CVE-2021-46195
16
If CXXFLAGS contains something unsupported by the build CXX,
Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
17
aarch64: Enable FP16 feature by default for Armv9
Andre Vieira <andre.simoesdiasvieira@arm.com>
18
Re-land 'ASan: move allocator base to avoid conflict with
Thurston Dang <thurston@google.com>
19
libcpp: Implement -Wbidi-chars for CVE-2021-42574 [PR103026]
Marek Polacek <polacek@redhat.com>
CVE-2021-42574
20
handle sysroot support for nativesdk-gcc
Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>
21
Add a recursion limit to the demangle_const function in the
Nick Clifton <nickc@redhat.com>
22
diagnostics: escape non-ASCII source bytes for certain
David Malcolm <dmalcolm@redhat.com>
CVE-2021-42574
23
aarch64: Update Neoverse N2 core definition
Andre Vieira <andre.simoesdiasvieira@arm.com>
24
gcc-4.3.1: ARCH_FLAGS_FOR_TARGET
Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>
25
Search target sysroot gcc version specific dirs with
Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>
26
arm: add armv9-a architecture to -march
Przemyslaw Wirkus <przemyslaw.wirkus@arm.com>
27
libatomic: Do not enforce march on aarch64
Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>
28
Add ssp_nonshared to link commandline for musl targets
Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>
29
Define GLIBC_DYNAMIC_LINKER and UCLIBC_DYNAMIC_LINKER
Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>
30
Makefile.in: Ensure build CPP/CPPFLAGS is used for build
Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
31
aarch64: add armv9-a to -march
Przemyslaw Wirkus <przemyslaw.wirkus@arm.com>
32
Patch #32
Wilco Dijkstra <wilco.dijkstra@arm.com>
33
Avoid using libdir from .la which usually points to a host
Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>
34
sync gcc stddef.h with musl
Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>
35
Use the multilib config files from ${B} instead of using the
Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>
36
Re-introduce spe commandline options
Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>
37
64-bit multilib hack.
Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>
38
Fix install path of linux64.h
Andrei Gherzan <andrei.gherzan@huawei.com>
39
libtool
Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>
40
cpp: honor sysroot.
Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>
Vulnerabilities#
Name
Analysis
Description
Exploitable
**DISPUTED**A failure in the -fstack-protector feature in GCC-based toolchains
that target AArch64 allows an attacker to exploit an existing buffer
overflow in dynamically-sized local variables in your application
without this being detected. This stack-protector failure only applies
to C99-style dynamically-sized local variables or those created using
alloca(). The stack-protector operates as intended for statically-sized
local variables.
The default behavior when the stack-protector
detects an overflow is to terminate your application, resulting in
controlled loss of availability. An attacker who can exploit a buffer
overflow without triggering the stack-protector might be able to change
program flow control to cause an uncontrolled loss of availability or to
go further and affect confidentiality or integrity. NOTE: The GCC project argues that this is a missed hardening bug and not a vulnerability by itself.
Patched
GCC v12.0 was discovered to contain an uncontrolled recursion via the component libiberty/rust-demangle.c. This vulnerability allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) by consuming excessive CPU and memory resources.
Patched
An issue was discovered in the Bidirectional Algorithm in the Unicode Specification through 14.0. It permits the visual reordering of characters via control sequences, which can be used to craft source code that renders different logic than the logical ordering of tokens ingested by compilers and interpreters. Adversaries can leverage this to encode source code for compilers accepting Unicode such that targeted vulnerabilities are introduced invisibly to human reviewers. NOTE: the Unicode Consortium offers the following alternative approach to presenting this concern. An issue is noted in the nature of international text that can affect applications that implement support for The Unicode Standard and the Unicode Bidirectional Algorithm (all versions). Due to text display behavior when text includes left-to-right and right-to-left characters, the visual order of tokens may be different from their logical order. Additionally, control characters needed to fully support the requirements of bidirectional text can further obfuscate the logical order of tokens. Unless mitigated, an adversary could craft source code such that the ordering of tokens perceived by human reviewers does not match what will be processed by a compiler/interpreter/etc. The Unicode Consortium has documented this class of vulnerability in its document, Unicode Technical Report #36, Unicode Security Considerations. The Unicode Consortium also provides guidance on mitigations for this class of issues in Unicode Technical Standard #39, Unicode Security Mechanisms, and in Unicode Standard Annex #31, Unicode Identifier and Pattern Syntax. Also, the BIDI specification allows applications to tailor the implementation in ways that can mitigate misleading visual reordering in program text; see HL4 in Unicode Standard Annex #9, Unicode Bidirectional Algorithm.