Logo
componentdropbear
Name
dropbear
Version
2025.89-
Type
library
Description
-
Licenses
-
PURL
-
CPE
cpe:2.3:a:dropbear_ssh_project:dropbear_ssh:2025.89:*:*:*:*:*:*:*

Other Versions#


Project
Branch
Version
master
2026.94-r1

Patches#


#
Title
Author
Resolve
1
Patch #1
Unknown
2
server: open authorized_keys files nonblocking
Matt Johnston <matt@ucc.asn.au>
3
Rework pubkey_options struct
Matt Johnston <matt@ucc.asn.au>
4
Patch #4
Unknown
5
Patch #5
Unknown
6
scp: Disallow -r to an existing directory
Matt Johnston <matt@ucc.asn.au>
CVE-2019-6111
7
scp: clear setuid/setgid bits on received files
Matt Johnston <matt@ucc.asn.au>
CVE-2026-35385
8
signkey: fix use of rsa-sha2-256 pubkeys
=?UTF-8?q?Petr=20=C5=A0tetiar?= <ynezz@true.cz>
9
scp: don't use reallocarray
Matt Johnston <matt@ucc.asn.au>
CVE-2019-6111
10
Patch #10
Unknown
11
scp: more CVE-2019-6111 fix
Matt Johnston <matt@ucc.asn.au>
CVE-2019-6111
12
Patch #12
Unknown
13
Patch #13
Unknown
14
Patch #14
Unknown
15
Patch #15
Unknown
16
scp: fix recursive overwrite check
Matt Johnston <matt@ucc.asn.au>
17
Fix incorrect index closing listeners
Matt Johnston <matt@ucc.asn.au>

Vulnerabilities#


Name
Analysis
Description
Exploitable
A vulnerability was determined in mkj Dropbear up to 2025.89. Impacted is the function unpackneg of the file src/curve25519.c of the component S Range Check. This manipulation causes improper verification of cryptographic signature. The attack can be initiated remotely. The attack is considered to have high complexity. The exploitability is considered difficult. The actual existence of this vulnerability is currently in question. Patch name: fdec3c90a15447bd538641d85e5a3e3ac981011d. To fix this issue, it is recommended to deploy a patch. The project maintainer explains: "Signature Malleability is not exploitable in SSH protocol. (...) [A] PoC doesn't exist for SSH implementation, but rather it's against the internal API."
Patched
In OpenSSH before 10.3, a file downloaded by scp may be installed setuid or setgid, an outcome contrary to some users' expectations, if the download is performed as root with -O (legacy scp protocol) and without -p (preserve mode).
Patched
An issue was discovered in OpenSSH 7.9. Due to the scp implementation being derived from 1983 rcp, the server chooses which files/directories are sent to the client. However, the scp client only performs cursory validation of the object name returned (only directory traversal attacks are prevented). A malicious scp server (or Man-in-The-Middle attacker) can overwrite arbitrary files in the scp client target directory. If recursive operation (-r) is performed, the server can manipulate subdirectories as well (for example, to overwrite the .ssh/authorized_keys file).