--- a\/hosts_access.c +++ b\/hosts_access.c @@ -240,6 +240,26 @@ struct request_info *request; } } +\/* hostfile_match - look up host patterns from file *\/ + +static int hostfile_match(path, host) +char *path; +struct hosts_info *host; +{ + char tok[BUFSIZ]; + int match = NO; + FILE *fp; + + if ((fp = fopen(path, "r")) != 0) { + while (fscanf(fp, "%s", tok) == 1 && !(match = host_match(tok, host))) + \/* void *\/ ; + fclose(fp); + } else if (errno != ENOENT) { + tcpd_warn("open %s: %m", path); + } + return (match); +} + \/* host_match - match host name and\/or address against pattern *\/ static int host_match(tok, host) @@ -267,6 +287,8 @@ struct host_info *host; tcpd_warn("netgroup support is disabled"); \/* not tcpd_jump() *\/ return (NO); #endif + } else if (tok[0] == '\/') { \/* \/file hack *\/ + return (hostfile_match(tok, host)); } else if (STR_EQ(tok, "KNOWN")) { \/* check address and name *\/ char *name = eval_hostname(host); return (STR_NE(eval_hostaddr(host), unknown) && HOSTNAME_KNOWN(name)); --- a\/tcpd.h +++ b\/tcpd.h @@ -4,6 +4,27 @@ * Author: Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands. *\/ +#ifndef _TCPWRAPPERS_TCPD_H +#define _TCPWRAPPERS_TCPD_H + +\/* someone else may have defined this *\/ +#undef __P + +\/* use prototypes if we have an ANSI C compiler or are using C++ *\/ +#if defined(__STDC__) || defined(__cplusplus) +#define __P(args) args +#else +#define __P(args) () +#endif + +\/* Need definitions of struct sockaddr_in and FILE. *\/ +#include +#include + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + \/* Structure to describe one communications endpoint. *\/ #define STRING_LENGTH 128 \/* hosts, users, processes *\/ @@ -25,10 +46,10 @@ struct request_info { char pid[10]; \/* access via eval_pid(request) *\/ struct host_info client[1]; \/* client endpoint info *\/ struct host_info server[1]; \/* server endpoint info *\/ - void (*sink) (); \/* datagram sink function or 0 *\/ - void (*hostname) (); \/* address to printable hostname *\/ - void (*hostaddr) (); \/* address to printable address *\/ - void (*cleanup) (); \/* cleanup function or 0 *\/ + void (*sink) __P((int)); \/* datagram sink function or 0 *\/ + void (*hostname) __P((struct host_info *)); \/* address to printable hostname *\/ + void (*hostaddr) __P((struct host_info *)); \/* address to printable address *\/ + void (*cleanup) __P((struct request_info *)); \/* cleanup function or 0 *\/ struct netconfig *config; \/* netdir handle *\/ }; @@ -61,25 +82,30 @@ extern char paranoid[]; \/* Global functions. *\/ #if defined(TLI) || defined(PTX) || defined(TLI_SEQUENT) -extern void fromhost(); \/* get\/validate client host info *\/ +extern void fromhost __P((struct request_info *)); \/* get\/validate client host info *\/ #else #define fromhost sock_host \/* no TLI support needed *\/ #endif -extern int hosts_access(); \/* access control *\/ -extern void shell_cmd(); \/* execute shell command *\/ -extern char *percent_x(); \/* do % expansion *\/ -extern void rfc931(); \/* client name from RFC 931 daemon *\/ -extern void clean_exit(); \/* clean up and exit *\/ -extern void refuse(); \/* clean up and exit *\/ -extern char *xgets(); \/* fgets() on steroids *\/ -extern char *split_at(); \/* strchr() and split *\/ -extern unsigned long dot_quad_addr(); \/* restricted inet_addr() *\/ +extern void shell_cmd __P((char *)); \/* execute shell command *\/ +extern char *percent_x __P((char *, int, char *, struct request_info *)); \/* do % expansion *\/ +extern void rfc931 __P((struct sockaddr_in *, struct sockaddr_in *, char *)); \/* client name from RFC 931 daemon *\/ +extern void clean_exit __P((struct request_info *)); \/* clean up and exit *\/ +extern void refuse __P((struct request_info *)); \/* clean up and exit *\/ +extern char *xgets __P((char *, int, FILE *)); \/* fgets() on steroids *\/ +extern char *split_at __P((char *, int)); \/* strchr() and split *\/ +extern unsigned long dot_quad_addr __P((char *)); \/* restricted inet_addr() *\/ \/* Global variables. *\/ +#ifdef HAVE_WEAKSYMS +extern int allow_severity __attribute__ ((weak)); \/* for connection logging *\/ +extern int deny_severity __attribute__ ((weak)); \/* for connection logging *\/ +#else extern int allow_severity; \/* for connection logging *\/ extern int deny_severity; \/* for connection logging *\/ +#endif + extern char *hosts_allow_table; \/* for verification mode redirection *\/ extern char *hosts_deny_table; \/* for verification mode redirection *\/ extern int hosts_access_verbose; \/* for verbose matching mode *\/ @@ -92,9 +118,14 @@ extern int resident; \/* > 0 if residen *\/ #ifdef __STDC__ +extern int hosts_access(struct request_info *request); +extern int hosts_ctl(char *daemon, char *client_name, char *client_addr, + char *client_user); extern struct request_info *request_init(struct request_info *,...); extern struct request_info *request_set(struct request_info *,...); #else +extern int hosts_access(); +extern int hosts_ctl(); extern struct request_info *request_init(); \/* initialize request *\/ extern struct request_info *request_set(); \/* update request structure *\/ #endif @@ -117,27 +148,31 @@ extern struct request_info *request_set( * host_info structures serve as caches for the lookup results. *\/ -extern char *eval_user(); \/* client user *\/ -extern char *eval_hostname(); \/* printable hostname *\/ -extern char *eval_hostaddr(); \/* printable host address *\/ -extern char *eval_hostinfo(); \/* host name or address *\/ -extern char *eval_client(); \/* whatever is available *\/ -extern char *eval_server(); \/* whatever is available *\/ +extern char *eval_user __P((struct request_info *)); \/* client user *\/ +extern char *eval_hostname __P((struct host_info *)); \/* printable hostname *\/ +extern char *eval_hostaddr __P((struct host_info *)); \/* printable host address *\/ +extern char *eval_hostinfo __P((struct host_info *)); \/* host name or address *\/ +extern char *eval_client __P((struct request_info *)); \/* whatever is available *\/ +extern char *eval_server __P((struct request_info *)); \/* whatever is available *\/ #define eval_daemon(r) ((r)->daemon) \/* daemon process name *\/ #define eval_pid(r) ((r)->pid) \/* process id *\/ \/* Socket-specific methods, including DNS hostname lookups. *\/ -extern void sock_host(); \/* look up endpoint addresses *\/ -extern void sock_hostname(); \/* translate address to hostname *\/ -extern void sock_hostaddr(); \/* address to printable address *\/ +\/* look up endpoint addresses *\/ +extern void sock_host __P((struct request_info *)); +\/* translate address to hostname *\/ +extern void sock_hostname __P((struct host_info *)); +\/* address to printable address *\/ +extern void sock_hostaddr __P((struct host_info *)); + #define sock_methods(r) \ { (r)->hostname = sock_hostname; (r)->hostaddr = sock_hostaddr; } \/* The System V Transport-Level Interface (TLI) interface. *\/ #if defined(TLI) || defined(PTX) || defined(TLI_SEQUENT) -extern void tli_host(); \/* look up endpoint addresses etc. *\/ +extern void tli_host __P((struct request_info *)); \/* look up endpoint addresses etc. *\/ #endif \/* @@ -178,7 +213,7 @@ extern struct tcpd_context tcpd_context; * behavior. *\/ -extern void process_options(); \/* execute options *\/ +extern void process_options __P((char *, struct request_info *)); \/* execute options *\/ extern int dry_run; \/* verification flag *\/ \/* Bug workarounds. *\/ @@ -217,3 +252,9 @@ extern char *fix_strtok(); #define strtok my_strtok extern char *my_strtok(); #endif + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif \/* tcpd.h *\/ --- a\/Makefile +++ b\/Makefile @@ -1,5 +1,10 @@ +GLIBC=$(shell grep -s -c __GLIBC__ \/usr\/include\/features.h) + # @(#) Makefile 1.23 97\/03\/21 19:27:20 +# unset the HOSTNAME environment variable +HOSTNAME = + what: @echo @echo "Usage: edit the REAL_DAEMON_DIR definition in the Makefile then:" @@ -19,7 +24,7 @@ what: @echo " generic (most bsd-ish systems with sys5 compatibility)" @echo " 386bsd aix alpha apollo bsdos convex-ultranet dell-gcc dgux dgux543" @echo " dynix epix esix freebsd hpux irix4 irix5 irix6 isc iunix" - @echo " linux machten mips(untested) ncrsvr4 netbsd next osf power_unix_211" + @echo " linux gnu machten mips(untested) ncrsvr4 netbsd next osf power_unix_211" @echo " ptx-2.x ptx-generic pyramid sco sco-nis sco-od2 sco-os5 sinix sunos4" @echo " sunos40 sunos5 sysv4 tandem ultrix unicos7 unicos8 unixware1 unixware2" @echo " uts215 uxp" @@ -43,8 +48,8 @@ what: # Ultrix 4.x SunOS 4.x ConvexOS 10.x Dynix\/ptx #REAL_DAEMON_DIR=\/usr\/etc # -# SysV.4 Solaris 2.x OSF AIX -#REAL_DAEMON_DIR=\/usr\/sbin +# SysV.4 Solaris 2.x OSF AIX Linux +REAL_DAEMON_DIR=\/usr\/sbin # # BSD 4.4 #REAL_DAEMON_DIR=\/usr\/libexec @@ -141,10 +146,21 @@ freebsd: LIBS= RANLIB=ranlib ARFLAGS=rv AUX_OBJ= NETGROUP= TLI= \ EXTRA_CFLAGS=-DSYS_ERRLIST_DEFINED VSYSLOG= all +ifneq ($(GLIBC),0) +MYLIB=-lnsl +endif + linux: @make REAL_DAEMON_DIR=$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR) STYLE=$(STYLE) \ - LIBS= RANLIB=ranlib ARFLAGS=rv AUX_OBJ=setenv.o \ - NETGROUP= TLI= EXTRA_CFLAGS="-DBROKEN_SO_LINGER" all + LIBS=$(MYLIB) RANLIB=ranlib ARFLAGS=rv AUX_OBJ=weak_symbols.o \ + NETGROUP=-DNETGROUP TLI= VSYSLOG= BUGS= all \ + EXTRA_CFLAGS="-DSYS_ERRLIST_DEFINED -DHAVE_WEAKSYMS -D_REENTRANT" + +gnu: + @make REAL_DAEMON_DIR=$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR) STYLE=$(STYLE) \ + LIBS=$(MYLIB) RANLIB=ranlib ARFLAGS=rv AUX_OBJ=weak_symbols.o \ + NETGROUP=-DNETGROUP TLI= VSYSLOG= BUGS= all \ + EXTRA_CFLAGS="-DHAVE_STRERROR -DHAVE_WEAKSYMS -D_REENTRANT" # This is good for many SYSV+BSD hybrids with NIS, probably also for HP-UX 7.x. hpux hpux8 hpux9 hpux10: @@ -391,7 +407,7 @@ AR = ar # the ones provided with this source distribution. The environ.c module # implements setenv(), getenv(), and putenv(). -AUX_OBJ= setenv.o +#AUX_OBJ= setenv.o #AUX_OBJ= environ.o #AUX_OBJ= environ.o strcasecmp.o @@ -454,7 +470,8 @@ AUX_OBJ= setenv.o # host name aliases. Compile with -DSOLARIS_24_GETHOSTBYNAME_BUG to work # around this. The workaround does no harm on other Solaris versions. -BUGS = -DGETPEERNAME_BUG -DBROKEN_FGETS -DLIBC_CALLS_STRTOK +BUGS = +#BUGS = -DGETPEERNAME_BUG -DBROKEN_FGETS -DLIBC_CALLS_STRTOK #BUGS = -DGETPEERNAME_BUG -DBROKEN_FGETS -DINET_ADDR_BUG #BUGS = -DGETPEERNAME_BUG -DBROKEN_FGETS -DSOLARIS_24_GETHOSTBYNAME_BUG @@ -464,7 +481,7 @@ BUGS = -DGETPEERNAME_BUG -DBROKEN_FGETS # If your system supports NIS or YP-style netgroups, enable the following # macro definition. Netgroups are used only for host access control. # -#NETGROUP= -DNETGROUP +NETGROUP= -DNETGROUP ############################################################### # System dependencies: whether or not your system has vsyslog() @@ -491,7 +508,7 @@ VSYSLOG = -Dvsyslog=myvsyslog # Uncomment the next definition to turn on the language extensions # (examples: allow, deny, banners, twist and spawn). # -#STYLE = -DPROCESS_OPTIONS # Enable language extensions. +STYLE = -DPROCESS_OPTIONS # Enable language extensions. ################################################################ # Optional: Changing the default disposition of logfile records @@ -514,7 +531,7 @@ VSYSLOG = -Dvsyslog=myvsyslog # # The LOG_XXX names below are taken from the \/usr\/include\/syslog.h file. -FACILITY= LOG_MAIL # LOG_MAIL is what most sendmail daemons use +FACILITY= LOG_DAEMON # LOG_MAIL is what most sendmail daemons use # The syslog priority at which successful connections are logged. @@ -610,7 +627,7 @@ TABLES = -DHOSTS_DENY=\"\/etc\/hosts.deny\ # Paranoid mode implies hostname lookup. In order to disable hostname # lookups altogether, see the next section. -PARANOID= -DPARANOID +#PARANOID= -DPARANOID ######################################## # Optional: turning off hostname lookups @@ -623,7 +640,7 @@ PARANOID= -DPARANOID # In order to perform selective hostname lookups, disable paranoid # mode (see previous section) and comment out the following definition. -HOSTNAME= -DALWAYS_HOSTNAME +#HOSTNAME= -DALWAYS_HOSTNAME ############################################# # Optional: Turning on host ADDRESS checking @@ -649,28 +666,46 @@ HOSTNAME= -DALWAYS_HOSTNAME # source-routed traffic in the kernel. Examples: 4.4BSD derivatives, # Solaris 2.x, and Linux. See your system documentation for details. # -# KILL_OPT= -DKILL_IP_OPTIONS +KILL_OPT= -DKILL_IP_OPTIONS ## End configuration options ############################ # Protection against weird shells or weird make programs. +CC = gcc SHELL = \/bin\/sh -.c.o:; $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -c $*.c +.c.o:; $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $*.o -c $*.c + +SOMAJOR = 0 +SOMINOR = 7.6 + +LIB = libwrap.a +SHLIB = shared\/libwrap.so.$(SOMAJOR).$(SOMINOR) +SHLIBSOMAJ= shared\/libwrap.so.$(SOMAJOR) +SHLIBSO = shared\/libwrap.so +SHLIBFLAGS = -Lshared -lwrap -CFLAGS = -O -DFACILITY=$(FACILITY) $(ACCESS) $(PARANOID) $(NETGROUP) \ +shared\/%.o: %.c + $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(SHCFLAGS) -c $< -o $@ + +CFLAGS = -O2 -g -DFACILITY=$(FACILITY) $(ACCESS) $(PARANOID) $(NETGROUP) \ $(BUGS) $(SYSTYPE) $(AUTH) $(UMASK) \ -DREAL_DAEMON_DIR=\"$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR)\" $(STYLE) $(KILL_OPT) \ -DSEVERITY=$(SEVERITY) -DRFC931_TIMEOUT=$(RFC931_TIMEOUT) \ $(UCHAR) $(TABLES) $(STRINGS) $(TLI) $(EXTRA_CFLAGS) $(DOT) \ $(VSYSLOG) $(HOSTNAME) +SHLINKFLAGS = -shared -Xlinker -soname -Xlinker libwrap.so.$(SOMAJOR) -lc $(LIBS) +SHCFLAGS = -fPIC -shared -D_REENTRANT + LIB_OBJ= hosts_access.o options.o shell_cmd.o rfc931.o eval.o \ hosts_ctl.o refuse.o percent_x.o clean_exit.o $(AUX_OBJ) \ $(FROM_OBJ) fix_options.o socket.o tli.o workarounds.o \ update.o misc.o diag.o percent_m.o myvsyslog.o +SHLIB_OBJ= $(addprefix shared\/, $(LIB_OBJ)); + FROM_OBJ= fromhost.o KIT = README miscd.c tcpd.c fromhost.c hosts_access.c shell_cmd.c \ @@ -684,46 +719,78 @@ KIT = README miscd.c tcpd.c fromhost.c h refuse.c tcpdchk.8 setenv.c inetcf.c inetcf.h scaffold.c \ scaffold.h tcpdmatch.8 README.NIS -LIB = libwrap.a - -all other: config-check tcpd tcpdmatch try-from safe_finger tcpdchk +all other: config-check tcpd tcpdmatch try-from safe_finger tcpdchk $(LIB) # Invalidate all object files when the compiler options (CFLAGS) have changed. config-check: @set +e; test -n "$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR)" || { make; exit 1; } - @set +e; echo $(CFLAGS) >\/tmp\/cflags.$$$$ ; \ - if cmp cflags \/tmp\/cflags.$$$$ ; \ - then rm \/tmp\/cflags.$$$$ ; \ - else mv \/tmp\/cflags.$$$$ cflags ; \ + @set +e; echo $(CFLAGS) >cflags.new ; \ + if cmp cflags cflags.new ; \ + then rm cflags.new ; \ + else mv cflags.new cflags ; \ fi >\/dev\/null 2>\/dev\/null + @if [ ! -d shared ]; then mkdir shared; fi $(LIB): $(LIB_OBJ) rm -f $(LIB) $(AR) $(ARFLAGS) $(LIB) $(LIB_OBJ) -$(RANLIB) $(LIB) -tcpd: tcpd.o $(LIB) - $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ tcpd.o $(LIB) $(LIBS) +$(SHLIB): $(SHLIB_OBJ) + rm -f $(SHLIB) + $(CC) -o $(SHLIB) $(SHLINKFLAGS) $(SHLIB_OBJ) + ln -s $(notdir $(SHLIB)) $(SHLIBSOMAJ) + ln -s $(notdir $(SHLIBSOMAJ)) $(SHLIBSO) + +tcpd: tcpd.o $(SHLIB) + $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ tcpd.o $(SHLIBFLAGS) -miscd: miscd.o $(LIB) - $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ miscd.o $(LIB) $(LIBS) +miscd: miscd.o $(SHLIB) + $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ miscd.o $(SHLIBFLAGS) -safe_finger: safe_finger.o $(LIB) - $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ safe_finger.o $(LIB) $(LIBS) +safe_finger: safe_finger.o $(SHLIB) + $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ safe_finger.o $(SHLIBFLAGS) TCPDMATCH_OBJ = tcpdmatch.o fakelog.o inetcf.o scaffold.o -tcpdmatch: $(TCPDMATCH_OBJ) $(LIB) - $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ $(TCPDMATCH_OBJ) $(LIB) $(LIBS) +tcpdmatch: $(TCPDMATCH_OBJ) $(SHLIB) + $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ $(TCPDMATCH_OBJ) $(SHLIBFLAGS) -try-from: try-from.o fakelog.o $(LIB) - $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ try-from.o fakelog.o $(LIB) $(LIBS) +try-from: try-from.o fakelog.o $(SHLIB) + $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ try-from.o fakelog.o $(SHLIBFLAGS) TCPDCHK_OBJ = tcpdchk.o fakelog.o inetcf.o scaffold.o -tcpdchk: $(TCPDCHK_OBJ) $(LIB) - $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ $(TCPDCHK_OBJ) $(LIB) $(LIBS) +tcpdchk: $(TCPDCHK_OBJ) $(SHLIB) + $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ $(TCPDCHK_OBJ) $(SHLIBFLAGS) + +install: install-lib install-bin install-dev + +install-lib: + install -o root -g root -m 0644 $(SHLIB) ${DESTDIR}\/lib\/ + ln -s $(notdir $(SHLIB)) ${DESTDIR}\/lib\/$(notdir $(SHLIBSOMAJ)) + +install-bin: + install -o root -g root -m 0755 tcpd ${DESTDIR}\/usr\/sbin\/ + install -o root -g root -m 0755 tcpdchk ${DESTDIR}\/usr\/sbin\/ + install -o root -g root -m 0755 tcpdmatch ${DESTDIR}\/usr\/sbin\/ + install -o root -g root -m 0755 try-from ${DESTDIR}\/usr\/sbin\/ + install -o root -g root -m 0755 safe_finger ${DESTDIR}\/usr\/sbin\/ + install -o root -g root -m 0644 tcpd.8 ${DESTDIR}\/usr\/share\/man\/man8\/ + install -o root -g root -m 0644 tcpdchk.8 ${DESTDIR}\/usr\/share\/man\/man8\/ + install -o root -g root -m 0644 tcpdmatch.8 ${DESTDIR}\/usr\/share\/man\/man8\/ + install -o root -g root -m 0644 hosts_access.5 ${DESTDIR}\/usr\/share\/man\/man5\/ + install -o root -g root -m 0644 hosts_options.5 ${DESTDIR}\/usr\/share\/man\/man5\/ + +install-dev: + ln -s \/lib\/$(notdir $(SHLIBSOMAJ)) ${DESTDIR}\/usr\/lib\/$(notdir $(SHLIBSO)) + install -o root -g root -m 0644 hosts_access.3 ${DESTDIR}\/usr\/share\/man\/man3\/ + install -o root -g root -m 0644 tcpd.h ${DESTDIR}\/usr\/include\/ + install -o root -g root -m 0644 $(LIB) ${DESTDIR}\/usr\/lib\/ + ln -s hosts_access.3 ${DESTDIR}\/usr\/share\/man\/man3\/hosts_ctl.3 + ln -s hosts_access.3 ${DESTDIR}\/usr\/share\/man\/man3\/request_init.3 + ln -s hosts_access.3 ${DESTDIR}\/usr\/share\/man\/man3\/request_set.3 shar: $(KIT) @shar $(KIT) @@ -739,7 +806,8 @@ archive: clean: rm -f tcpd miscd safe_finger tcpdmatch tcpdchk try-from *.[oa] core \ - cflags + cflags libwrap*.so* + rm -rf shared tidy: clean chmod -R a+r . @@ -885,5 +953,6 @@ update.o: cflags update.o: mystdarg.h update.o: tcpd.h vfprintf.o: cflags +weak_symbols.o: tcpd.h workarounds.o: cflags workarounds.o: tcpd.h --- a\/hosts_access.5 +++ b\/hosts_access.5 @@ -8,9 +8,9 @@ name, host name\/address) patterns. Exam impatient reader is encouraged to skip to the EXAMPLES section for a quick introduction. .PP -An extended version of the access control language is described in the -\fIhosts_options\fR(5) document. The extensions are turned on at -program build time by building with -DPROCESS_OPTIONS. +The extended version of the access control language is described in the +\fIhosts_options\fR(5) document. \fBNote that this language supersedes +the meaning of \fIshell_command\fB as documented below.\fR .PP In the following text, \fIdaemon\fR is the the process name of a network daemon process, and \fIclient\fR is the name and\/or address of @@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ A newline character is ignored when it i character. This permits you to break up long lines so that they are easier to edit. .IP \(bu -Blank lines or lines that begin with a `#\' character are ignored. +Blank lines or lines that begin with a `#' character are ignored. This permits you to insert comments and whitespace so that the tables are easier to read. .IP \(bu @@ -69,26 +69,33 @@ checks are case insensitive. .SH PATTERNS The access control language implements the following patterns: .IP \(bu -A string that begins with a `.\' character. A host name is matched if +A string that begins with a `.' character. A host name is matched if the last components of its name match the specified pattern. For -example, the pattern `.tue.nl\' matches the host name -`wzv.win.tue.nl\'. +example, the pattern `.tue.nl' matches the host name +`wzv.win.tue.nl'. .IP \(bu -A string that ends with a `.\' character. A host address is matched if +A string that ends with a `.' character. A host address is matched if its first numeric fields match the given string. For example, the -pattern `131.155.\' matches the address of (almost) every host on the +pattern `131.155.' matches the address of (almost) every host on the Eind\%hoven University network (131.155.x.x). .IP \(bu -A string that begins with an `@\' character is treated as an NIS +A string that begins with an `@' character is treated as an NIS (formerly YP) netgroup name. A host name is matched if it is a host member of the specified netgroup. Netgroup matches are not supported for daemon process names or for client user names. .IP \(bu -An expression of the form `n.n.n.n\/m.m.m.m\' is interpreted as a -`net\/mask\' pair. A host address is matched if `net\' is equal to the -bitwise AND of the address and the `mask\'. For example, the net\/mask -pattern `131.155.72.0\/255.255.254.0\' matches every address in the -range `131.155.72.0\' through `131.155.73.255\'. +An expression of the form `n.n.n.n\/m.m.m.m' is interpreted as a +`net\/mask' pair. A host address is matched if `net' is equal to the +bitwise AND of the address and the `mask'. For example, the net\/mask +pattern `131.155.72.0\/255.255.254.0' matches every address in the +range `131.155.72.0' through `131.155.73.255'. +.IP \(bu +A string that begins with a `\/' character is treated as a file +name. A host name or address is matched if it matches any host name +or address pattern listed in the named file. The file format is +zero or more lines with zero or more host name or address patterns +separated by whitespace. A file name pattern can be used anywhere +a host name or address pattern can be used. .SH WILDCARDS The access control language supports explicit wildcards: .IP ALL @@ -115,19 +122,19 @@ without -DPARANOID when you want more co .ne 6 .SH OPERATORS .IP EXCEPT -Intended use is of the form: `list_1 EXCEPT list_2\'; this construct +Intended use is of the form: `list_1 EXCEPT list_2'; this construct matches anything that matches \fIlist_1\fR unless it matches \fIlist_2\fR. The EXCEPT operator can be used in daemon_lists and in client_lists. The EXCEPT operator can be nested: if the control -language would permit the use of parentheses, `a EXCEPT b EXCEPT c\' -would parse as `(a EXCEPT (b EXCEPT c))\'. +language would permit the use of parentheses, `a EXCEPT b EXCEPT c' +would parse as `(a EXCEPT (b EXCEPT c))'. .br .ne 6 .SH SHELL COMMANDS If the first-matched access control rule contains a shell command, that command is subjected to % substitutions (see next section). The result is executed by a \fI\/bin\/sh\fR child process with standard -input, output and error connected to \fI\/dev\/null\fR. Specify an `&\' +input, output and error connected to \fI\/dev\/null\fR. Specify an `&' at the end of the command if you do not want to wait until it has completed. .PP @@ -159,7 +166,7 @@ depending on how much information is ava .IP %u The client user name (or "unknown"). .IP %% -Expands to a single `%\' character. +Expands to a single `%' character. .PP Characters in % expansions that may confuse the shell are replaced by underscores. @@ -243,9 +250,9 @@ A positive IDENT lookup result (the clie less trustworthy. It is possible for an intruder to spoof both the client connection and the IDENT lookup, although doing so is much harder than spoofing just a client connection. It may also be that -the client\'s IDENT server is lying. +the client's IDENT server is lying. .PP -Note: IDENT lookups don\'t work with UDP services. +Note: IDENT lookups don't work with UDP services. .SH EXAMPLES The language is flexible enough that different types of access control policy can be expressed with a minimum of fuss. Although the language @@ -285,7 +292,7 @@ ALL: LOCAL @some_netgroup .br ALL: .foobar.edu EXCEPT terminalserver.foobar.edu .PP -The first rule permits access from hosts in the local domain (no `.\' +The first rule permits access from hosts in the local domain (no `.' in the host name) and from members of the \fIsome_netgroup\fP netgroup. The second rule permits access from all hosts in the \fIfoobar.edu\fP domain (notice the leading dot), with the exception of @@ -322,8 +329,8 @@ in.tftpd: LOCAL, .my.domain \/etc\/hosts.deny: .in +3 .nf -in.tftpd: ALL: (\/some\/where\/safe_finger -l @%h | \\ - \/usr\/ucb\/mail -s %d-%h root) & +in.tftpd: ALL: (\/usr\/sbin\/safe_finger -l @%h | \\ + \/usr\/bin\/mail -s %d-%h root) & .fi .PP The safe_finger command comes with the tcpd wrapper and should be @@ -349,7 +356,7 @@ control rule; when the length of an acce capacity of an internal buffer; when an access control rule is not terminated by a newline character; when the result of % expansion would overflow an internal buffer; when a system call fails -that shouldn\'t. All problems are reported via the syslog daemon. +that shouldn't. All problems are reported via the syslog daemon. .SH FILES .na .nf --- a\/rfc931.c +++ b\/rfc931.c @@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ static char sccsid[] = "@(#) rfc931.c 1. int rfc931_timeout = RFC931_TIMEOUT;\/* Global so it can be changed *\/ -static jmp_buf timebuf; +static sigjmp_buf timebuf; \/* fsocket - open stdio stream on top of socket *\/ @@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ int protocol; static void timeout(sig) int sig; { - longjmp(timebuf, sig); + siglongjmp(timebuf, sig); } \/* rfc931 - return remote user name, given socket structures *\/ @@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ char *dest; * Set up a timer so we won't get stuck while waiting for the server. *\/ - if (setjmp(timebuf) == 0) { + if (sigsetjmp(timebuf,1) == 0) { signal(SIGALRM, timeout); alarm(rfc931_timeout); --- a\/tcpd.8 +++ b\/tcpd.8 @@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ configuration files. .PP The example assumes that the network daemons live in \/usr\/etc. On some systems, network daemons live in \/usr\/sbin or in \/usr\/libexec, or have -no `in.\' prefix to their name. +no `in.' prefix to their name. .SH EXAMPLE 2 This example applies when \fItcpd\fR expects that the network daemons are left in their original place. @@ -110,26 +110,26 @@ finger stream tcp nowait nobody \/us becomes: .sp .ti +5 -finger stream tcp nowait nobody \/some\/where\/tcpd in.fingerd +finger stream tcp nowait nobody \/usr\/sbin\/tcpd in.fingerd .sp .fi .PP The example assumes that the network daemons live in \/usr\/etc. On some systems, network daemons live in \/usr\/sbin or in \/usr\/libexec, the -daemons have no `in.\' prefix to their name, or there is no userid +daemons have no `in.' prefix to their name, or there is no userid field in the inetd configuration file. .PP Similar changes will be needed for the other services that are to be -covered by \fItcpd\fR. Send a `kill -HUP\' to the \fIinetd\fR(8) +covered by \fItcpd\fR. Send a `kill -HUP' to the \fIinetd\fR(8) process to make the changes effective. AIX users may also have to -execute the `inetimp\' command. +execute the `inetimp' command. .SH EXAMPLE 3 In the case of daemons that do not live in a common directory ("secret" or otherwise), edit the \fIinetd\fR configuration file so that it specifies an absolute path name for the process name field. For example: .nf .sp - ntalk dgram udp wait root \/some\/where\/tcpd \/usr\/local\/lib\/ntalkd + ntalk dgram udp wait root \/usr\/sbin\/tcpd \/usr\/sbin\/in.ntalkd .sp .fi .PP --- a\/hosts_access.3 +++ b\/hosts_access.3 @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ hosts_access, hosts_ctl, request_init, request_set \- access control library .SH SYNOPSIS .nf -#include "tcpd.h" +#include extern int allow_severity; extern int deny_severity; --- a\/options.c +++ b\/options.c @@ -473,6 +473,9 @@ static struct syslog_names log_fac[] = { #ifdef LOG_CRON "cron", LOG_CRON, #endif +#ifdef LOG_FTP + "ftp", LOG_FTP, +#endif #ifdef LOG_LOCAL0 "local0", LOG_LOCAL0, #endif --- a\/fix_options.c +++ b\/fix_options.c @@ -35,7 +35,8 @@ struct request_info *request; #ifdef IP_OPTIONS unsigned char optbuf[BUFFER_SIZE \/ 3], *cp; char lbuf[BUFFER_SIZE], *lp; - int optsize = sizeof(optbuf), ipproto; + socklen_t optsize = sizeof(optbuf); + int ipproto; struct protoent *ip; int fd = request->fd; unsigned int opt; --- a\/workarounds.c +++ b\/workarounds.c @@ -163,7 +163,11 @@ int *fromlen; int fix_getpeername(sock, sa, len) int sock; struct sockaddr *sa; +#if !defined(__GLIBC__) int *len; +#else \/* __GLIBC__ *\/ +size_t *len; +#endif \/* __GLIBC__ *\/ { int ret; struct sockaddr_in *sin = (struct sockaddr_in *) sa; --- a\/socket.c +++ b\/socket.c @@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ struct request_info *request; { static struct sockaddr_in client; static struct sockaddr_in server; - int len; + socklen_t len; char buf[BUFSIZ]; int fd = request->fd; @@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ int fd; { char buf[BUFSIZ]; struct sockaddr_in sin; - int size = sizeof(sin); + socklen_t size = sizeof(sin); \/* * Eat up the not-yet received datagram. Some systems insist on a --- a\/safe_finger.c +++ b\/safe_finger.c @@ -26,21 +26,24 @@ static char sccsid[] = "@(#) safe_finger #include #include #include +#include extern void exit(); \/* Local stuff *\/ -char path[] = "PATH=\/bin:\/usr\/bin:\/usr\/ucb:\/usr\/bsd:\/etc:\/usr\/etc:\/usr\/sbin"; +char path[] = "PATH=\/bin:\/usr\/bin:\/sbin:\/usr\/sbin"; #define TIME_LIMIT 60 \/* Do not keep listinging forever *\/ #define INPUT_LENGTH 100000 \/* Do not keep listinging forever *\/ #define LINE_LENGTH 128 \/* Editors can choke on long lines *\/ #define FINGER_PROGRAM "finger" \/* Most, if not all, UNIX systems *\/ #define UNPRIV_NAME "nobody" \/* Preferred privilege level *\/ -#define UNPRIV_UGID 32767 \/* Default uid and gid *\/ +#define UNPRIV_UGID 65534 \/* Default uid and gid *\/ int finger_pid; +int allow_severity = SEVERITY; +int deny_severity = LOG_WARNING; void cleanup(sig) int sig; --- a\/hosts_options.5 +++ b\/hosts_options.5 @@ -58,12 +58,12 @@ Notice the leading dot on the domain nam Execute, in a child process, the specified shell command, after performing the % expansions described in the hosts_access(5) manual page. The command is executed with stdin, stdout and stderr -connected to the null device, so that it won\'t mess up the +connected to the null device, so that it won't mess up the conversation with the client host. Example: .sp .nf .ti +3 -spawn (\/some\/where\/safe_finger -l @%h | \/usr\/ucb\/mail root) & +spawn (\/usr\/sbin\/safe_finger -l @%h | \/usr\/bin\/mail root) & .fi .sp executes, in a background child process, the shell command "safe_finger --- a\/tcpdchk.c +++ b\/tcpdchk.c @@ -350,6 +350,8 @@ char *pat; { if (pat[0] == '@') { tcpd_warn("%s: daemon name begins with \"@\"", pat); + } else if (pat[0] == '\/') { + tcpd_warn("%s: daemon name begins with \"\/\"", pat); } else if (pat[0] == '.') { tcpd_warn("%s: daemon name begins with dot", pat); } else if (pat[strlen(pat) - 1] == '.') { @@ -382,6 +384,8 @@ char *pat; { if (pat[0] == '@') { \/* @netgroup *\/ tcpd_warn("%s: user name begins with \"@\"", pat); + } else if (pat[0] == '\/') { + tcpd_warn("%s: user name begins with \"\/\"", pat); } else if (pat[0] == '.') { tcpd_warn("%s: user name begins with dot", pat); } else if (pat[strlen(pat) - 1] == '.') { @@ -402,8 +406,13 @@ char *pat; static int check_host(pat) char *pat; { + char buf[BUFSIZ]; char *mask; int addr_count = 1; + FILE *fp; + struct tcpd_context saved_context; + char *cp; + char *wsp = " \t\r\n"; if (pat[0] == '@') { \/* @netgroup *\/ #ifdef NO_NETGRENT @@ -422,6 +431,21 @@ char *pat; tcpd_warn("netgroup support disabled"); #endif #endif + } else if (pat[0] == '\/') { \/* \/path\/name *\/ + if ((fp = fopen(pat, "r")) != 0) { + saved_context = tcpd_context; + tcpd_context.file = pat; + tcpd_context.line = 0; + while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), fp)) { + tcpd_context.line++; + for (cp = strtok(buf, wsp); cp; cp = strtok((char *) 0, wsp)) + check_host(cp); + } + tcpd_context = saved_context; + fclose(fp); + } else if (errno != ENOENT) { + tcpd_warn("open %s: %m", pat); + } } else if (mask = split_at(pat, '\/')) { \/* network\/netmask *\/ if (dot_quad_addr(pat) == INADDR_NONE || dot_quad_addr(mask) == INADDR_NONE) --- a\/percent_m.c +++ b\/percent_m.c @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ static char sccsid[] = "@(#) percent_m.c #include extern int errno; -#ifndef SYS_ERRLIST_DEFINED +#if !defined(SYS_ERRLIST_DEFINED) && !defined(HAVE_STRERROR) extern char *sys_errlist[]; extern int sys_nerr; #endif @@ -29,11 +29,15 @@ char *ibuf; while (*bp = *cp) if (*cp == '%' && cp[1] == 'm') { +#ifdef HAVE_STRERROR + strcpy(bp, strerror(errno)); +#else if (errno < sys_nerr && errno > 0) { strcpy(bp, sys_errlist[errno]); } else { sprintf(bp, "Unknown error %d", errno); } +#endif bp += strlen(bp); cp += 2; } else { --- a\/scaffold.c +++ b\/scaffold.c @@ -180,10 +180,12 @@ struct request_info *request; \/* ARGSUSED *\/ -void rfc931(request) -struct request_info *request; +void rfc931(rmt_sin, our_sin, dest) +struct sockaddr_in *rmt_sin; +struct sockaddr_in *our_sin; +char *dest; { - strcpy(request->user, unknown); + strcpy(dest, unknown); } \/* check_path - examine accessibility *\/ --- \/dev\/null +++ b\/weak_symbols.c @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ + \/* + * @(#) weak_symbols.h 1.5 99\/12\/29 23:50 + * + * Author: Anthony Towns + *\/ + +#ifdef HAVE_WEAKSYMS +#include +int deny_severity = LOG_WARNING; +int allow_severity = SEVERITY; +#endif

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